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Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Antitrust Laws 
Herbert Hovenkamp
*
 
 
Introduction 
When foreign conduct is involved, the courts customarily appraise its substantive 
antitrust significance only after deciding whether the Sherman Act asserts jurisdiction 
over it. Nevertheless, “jurisdictional” and “substantive” inquiries are not wholly 
independent. Both inquiries rest on judgments about the apparent will of Congress with 
respect to foreign transactions. And both reflect two sound propositions: that Congress 
did not intend American antitrust law to rule the entire commercial world and that 
Congress knew that domestic economic circumstances often differ from those abroad 
where mechanical application of domestic antitrust decisions would make little 
economic, political, or social sense. Further, many appraisals of the appropriateness of 
asserting jurisdiction include an appraisal of the anticompetitive harm caused by the 
challenged restraint— and the latter is a largely substantive inquiry. 
In examining a foreign restraint, the conclusion that Congress did not mean to cover 
it might be expressed either in terms of the statute's jurisdiction or subject matter reach, 
or else in terms of a substantive conclusion about the “reasonableness” of the restraint 
under the circumstances. In either event, the examination must consider conflicts with 
other countries, the international law and common law principles governing them, the 
availability of appropriate and effective remedies, and the nature and significance of the 
challenged conduct and its effects, which is what justifies the United States' interest in 
the first place. The circumstances surrounding a foreign restraint may dictate a legal 
conclusion different from that which would be appropriate to the same restraint at home. 
The relevant differences might be found in both the quality and magnitude of the 
restraint's threats to protected interests, offsetting virtues, and less restrictive 
alternatives. 
 
"Reasonableness" and the Interests of Foreign Nations 
 
Most antitrust appraisals under United States law, whether domestic or foreign, 
demand an appreciation of the challenged conduct's harm to the American economy, 
redeeming benefits to the parties and society, and the alternative and less harmful 
means of accomplishing legitimate ends. The foreignness of a restraint can affect each 
of these three factors. Some of the anticompetitive tendencies of a particular type of 
restraint might be entirely irrelevant to the United States commerce with which the 
Sherman Act is concerned. Thus, the relevant harmful effects or tendencies of the 
particular restraint may be fewer in number and smaller in magnitude than for the same 
restraint occurring in a wholly domestic context. Indeed, foreign government regulations 
                                                          
*
 Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
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or other circumstances of foreign markets sometimes indicate that absent the restraint 
there would be no United States commerce at all in the good in question.
1
 
The redeeming virtues might also be different in the international context. Risks, the 
need for combining complementary resources, or scale economies might be greater in 
some international combinations. Or the customary terms of dealing in foreign markets 
might be different such that the less restrictive alternatives available at home would not 
be available abroad. 
Thus the conventional assumptions that courts make in appraising restraints in 
domestic markets are not necessarily applicable in foreign markets. A foreign joint 
venture among competitors, for example, might be more “reasonable” than a 
comparable domestic transaction in several respects: the actual or potential harms 
touching American commerce may be more remote; the parties' necessities may be 
greater in view of foreign market circumstances; and the alternatives may be fewer, 
more burdensome, or less helpful. 
Much conduct abroad, particularly involving agreements among competitors, would 
be illegal per se if it were domestic—that is, it would be condemned without proof of 
particular effects and with little regard for possible justifications. Does extraterritoriality 
call for a fundamentally different analysis? Perhaps sometimes, but clearly not always. 
Domestic antitrust policy uses per se rules for conduct that, in most of its 
manifestations, is potentially very dangerous with little or no redeeming virtue.  That 
rationale would be inapplicable to foreign restraints that either pose very little danger to 
American commerce or have more persuasive justifications than are likely in similar 
restraints at home. For example, price fixing in a foreign country might have some but 
very little impact on United States commerce at all.  This would be true, for example, if a 
naked foreign cartel made no sales into the United States, either directly or indirectly.  
Alternatively, the foreign cartel it might be encouraged or even compelled by the foreign 
county's domestic policy. 
Nevertheless, one should not leap too quickly from the premise that additional 
“reasonableness” inquiries are necessary when the restraint occurs abroad, to the 
conclusion that all foreign restraints merit full rule of reason inquiries, including rigorous 
market definition, market power assessment, and a conclusion supported by a well-
developed record about overall anticompetitive effects. To be sure, we sometimes say 
that the per se rule condemns practices without a showing of competitive effects in the 
particular case. By contrast, appraising restraints abroad requires an assessment of 
effects on American foreign commerce. 
But the effects to be measured are not the same. An impact on prices or injury to 
several American traders or interests might be quite sufficient to indicate a significant 
effect on commerce, but identifying these effects alone would not be sufficient to a full 
                                                          
1
 See, e.g., United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D. Mass. 
1950) (Wyzanski, J., observing that if American exporters are denied access to a foreign country, 
then any agreement overcoming the denial could not “restrain” or “monopolize,” for in its 
absence there would be no trade at all). 
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rule of reason inquiry, which must often make some assessment of overall market 
impact and also consider defenses. This is especially true when considerations of 
comity point in favor of liability. For example, the competition law of the European Union 
and most countries today abhor “naked” cartels about as much as United States law 
does.
2
 Jurisdiction in the courts of the United States over such a cartel under the 
“effects” test can generally be established simply by showing that the naked price fixing 
exists and that a substantial number of sales were made to United States buyers. No 
considerations of comity require analysis beyond the observation that the restraint is 
just as unlawful under the relevant foreign law as under the Sherman Act. At that point 
the same considerations that justify a per se inquiry for a domestic cartel would apply: 
Nothing is likely to be gained by a further, expensive inquiry into market definition or 
power or a consideration of defenses relating to the reasonableness of the prices 
charged and the like. Further, the rule of reason makes criminal prosecution virtually 
impossible, yet extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction under the federal antitrust laws seems 
relatively clear. Finally, discovery in rule of reason cases is difficult and costly enough in 
domestic antitrust disputes. These difficulties and costs can loom far larger when the 
relevant markets to be considered are abroad. 
In sum, to say that domestic per se rules are not necessarily and automatically 
applicable in the international context is not to say that an antitrust court needs to 
hesitate very long before condemning restraints with significant and obvious effects on 
United States commerce and without any plausible purpose other than the suppression 
of competition with and in the United States, and in particular when United States policy 
is in alignment with the policies of other affected nations.  Many of the major litigated 
international restraint cases fall into this category.
9
  In Timken, the Supreme Court 
rejected a claim of “reasonableness” by defendants, who had eliminated competition 
among themselves in England, France, and the United States. But the defendants' claim 
was unpersuasive, given the facts that the restraint long antedated and was broader 
than the claimed justification and that the court found that competition was possible and 
would have occurred absent the long-standing restraint. 
To this extent, the "effects" test as applied to extraterritorial jurisdiction resembles, at 
                                                          
2
 E.g., Stichting Sigarettenindustries, Joined Cases 240-242, 261-262, 268, 269/82 E.C.R. 
3831 [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶14,265 (1985). See Ivo Van Bael 
& Jean-Franois Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, chs. 4-5 (4th ed. 2005); 
Lennart Ritter & W. David Braun, European Competition Law: A Practitioner's Guide Ch. 3 (3d 
ed. 2004). 
9
See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. 
Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd per curiam, 325 U.S. 903 (1956); 
United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); 
United States v. GE Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (price fixing and patent pooling 
covering both domestic and foreign markets); United States v. GE Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 
1949) (lamps; territorial division agreements between domestic and foreign firms); 115 F. Supp. 
835 (D.N.J. 1953) (lamp remedies). 
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least roughly, the “affecting commerce”, test for domestic jurisdiction.
11
 Strictly 
speaking, one cannot appraise the Constitutionally required effect on interstate 
commerce without looking at “effects” generally, an inquiry that goes beyond what is 
required by the per se rule. But in fact the courts have not required such an appraisal of 
actual magnitudes in the domestic setting. Rather, they simply require a showing of 
some not insignificant effect or of an inference that “as a matter of practical economics” 
the alleged restraint seems reasonably calculated to produce such effects.
12
 The 
“affecting foreign commerce” test for extraterritorial jurisdiction is not different in 
principle, although conditions of comity may sometimes require somewhat more 
strictness in proof. For example, once the foreign cartel and actual imports into the 
United States are found, an effect on United States commerce can be presumed without 
proof of the amount by which output was reduced or price increased. 
At the same time, of course, one must consider the possibility of important 
differences between domestic and international markets in (1) the environmental 
circumstances bearing upon the “reasonableness” of a given restraint, (2) the degree to 
which United States interests are significantly affected, (3) the involvement of foreign 
governments, and (4) the costs and other difficulties of discovery. On the second point, 
while a domestic Commerce Clause case raises concerns about local versus interstate 
impact, both are markets within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
Commerce Clause limitations notwithstanding, the states are sovereigns that are still 
subordinate to the federal government. By contrast, when the restraint is abroad, the 
possibility arises that it has no or only limited effect on any interest that the United 
States government is authorized to protect. 
The other important observation about the above mentioned points is that they do 
not always apply. When they do not, the general considerations of administrative 
economy that justify applying the per se rule should control. 
The cases are not entirely consistent with these propositions. Most significantly, in 
Metro Industries the Ninth Circuit concluded that a rule of reason inquiry is necessary in 
all cases involving restraints abroad:
13
 
Because conduct occurring outside the United States is only a 
violation of the Sherman Act if it has a sufficient negative impact on 
commerce in the United States, per se analysis is not appropriate. 
Indeed, when the alleged illegal conduct occurred in a foreign 
country, we must examine the impact on commerce in the United 
States before we can determine that we have subject matter 
jurisdiction over a claim.
14
 
                                                          
11
See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW  ¶266d (4th ed. 
2013). 
12
See id., ¶266f, g, discussing Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 
738, 745 (1976); and McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980). 
13
Metro Industries, Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 868 
(1996). 
14
Id. at 843. 
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The court later elaborated: 
Thus, the potential illegality of actions occurring outside the Untied 
States requires an inquiry into the impact on commerce in the 
United States, regardless of the inherently suspect appearance of 
the foreign activities. Consequently, where a Sherman Act claim is 
based on conduct outside the United States, we apply rule of 
reason analysis to determine whether there is a Sherman Act 
violation.
15
 
The court then concluded that because the defendant had not been successful in 
defining a relevant market, the case must be dismissed. However, then, and more 
elaborately, it also found that the restraint at issue was complex, had significant 
efficiency potential, and thus a rule of reason inquiry would be necessary in any event. 
Perhaps the court's conclusion that restraints abroad always require rule of reason 
analysis would have been more qualified had the restraint before it belonged more 
clearly in the per se category without offsetting considerations of comity. 
The Empagran case
16
 involved a cartel that was the subject of criminal prosecution. 
However, the Supreme Court never spoke of the offense in either per se or rule of 
reason terms. Neither did the D.C. Circuit's initial opinion, which the Supreme Court 
reversed.
17
 The Kruman case, which was subsequently abrogated by the Supreme 
Court's Empagran decision, held that the per se rule should be applied to a cartel that 
involved one American and one foreign participant, and where the foreign plaintiff had 
purchased from the foreign participant.
18
 
In its now superseded 1977 Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, the 
Department of Justice stated only that the rule of reason should have somewhat 
broader application with respect to restraints abroad than over domestic restraints. This 
was true for two reasons. First, the court might have less experience with the foreign 
restraint; and, second, acts in foreign commerce might have some justifications that 
would not be recognized in the entirely domestic setting.
19
 But the current international 
antitrust Guidelines issued in 1994 generally ignore the issue, noting only that the 
National Cooperative Research and Production Act.
20
 requires that qualifying joint 
ventures be judged under the rule of reason—something that the Justice Department 
would ordinarily do anyway for bona fide joint ventures.
21
 However, in measuring 
“substantial” effects on United States commerce, the Guidelines appear to be ready to 
look at the gross amount of such effects, rather than the proportionate impact within a 
                                                          
15
Id. at 845. 
16
See F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).  
17
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-Laroche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 
155 (2004). 
18
Kruman v. Christie's Intl. PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 
987 (2003). 
19
Antitrust Guide for International Operations 2-3 (1977, superseded). 
20
15 U.S.C. §§4301-4306. 
21
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations §2.5 (1994). 
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relevant market.
22
 Further, in an example involving a naked cartel shipping goods into 
the United States, the Guidelines offer only a brief analysis concluding that the 
government could assert jurisdiction, with no suggestion that the rule of reason would 
be applied in such a case.
23
  Even when prosecuting criminals under the per se rule, the 
Government often issues penalties that are based on the volume of affected 
commerce.
3
 
The Metro Industries decision was correct to note that an “effect” on United States 
foreign commerce must be established in a case involving activity abroad. But “effects” 
tests also govern Commerce Clause jurisdiction in domestic antitrust cases. Such tests 
hardly serve to undermine the per se rule. Even in per se cases, however, the court 
assesses effect by asking whether “as a matter of practical economics” the restraint is 
likely to have the alleged effect.
24
 The assessment of foreign commerce proceeds in the 
same manner. Considerations of comity may sometimes require additional scrutiny in 
order to ensure that a sufficient United States interest is at stake, but only if the 
assertion of United States authority conflicts in an important way with the foreign 
sovereign's policy. 
The Metro Industries insistence on rule of reason treatment for all restraints abroad 
is in fact a logical outgrowth of the Ninth Circuit's earlier and problematic Timberlane 
case.  That decision required judges to consider numerous softer considerations of 
comity, thus permitting them to decline to address the merits of a case even when 
jurisdiction under the effects test is clear and the challenged activity was not compelled 
or necessarily even tolerated by foreign law.
94
 Unfortunately the “jurisdictional rule of 
reason” that Timberlane adopted is cumbersome, often indeterminate, conducive to 
lengthy and expensive discovery, and thus extremely burdensome to both litigants and 
courts. While the Supreme Court's Empagran decision did not purport to overrule 
Timberlane,
95
 the Court's much more generalized and speedier inquiry is largely 
inconsistent with the burdensome, fact-laden inquiry contemplated in Timberlane. 
                                                          
22
Id. at §3.11. 
23
Id., illustrative example A. 
3
 See, e.g., United States v. VandeBrake, 679 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1994). 
24
See 1B ANTITRUST LAW ¶266f1, discussing McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 
242-247 (1980). 
94
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F. 
Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 
(1985). 
95
The Supreme Court cited Timberlane only once, for a proposition that it agreed with: 
See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 
(C.A.9 1976) (insisting that the foreign conduct's domestic effect be 
“sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs” 
(emphasis added)). 
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 173. 
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One problem with Timberlane is that, notwithstanding its broad concept of comity, 
the court seemed excessively receptive to considering a dispute originating on foreign 
soil, and impeaching foreign judicial processes, merely because of a minor impact on 
goods that might ultimately reach American shores. Ultimately, however, the court quite 
correctly declined to apply United States antitrust law because the impact upon 
American imports seemed trivial and the activity challenged (foreclosure of a lien in 
Honduras) was peculiarly local. 
A Honduran lumber firm was indebted to the Honduran branch of an American bank, 
which caused Honduran liens to be placed on the former's property. The bank allegedly 
bribed a Honduran judicial officer to enforce the lien and thereby close down the 
operation. In violation of the Honduran court's order, the debtor had surreptitiously 
assigned of some of those assets to Timberlane, an American company, which then 
brought a federal antitrust action. The substantive antitrust claim was that the bank's 
foreclosure was part of some vague conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from establishing 
itself in Honduras as a lumber supplier to the United States in competition with domestic 
lumber sellers in which the bank had some interest.
97
 The jurisdictional claim was that 
preventing the plaintiff's entry into the Honduran lumber business affected imports into 
the United States and thus competition in the American lumber market. 
We might well wonder why the Act of State doctrine did not foreclose inquiry into the 
official behavior of Honduran courts and their officials.
98
 Further, even if all the 
challenged conduct had taken place within the United States, we might also wonder 
how the apparently lawful foreclosure on an indisputably valid and undoubtedly unpaid 
debt could violate the antitrust laws. Indeed, in the domestic context the invoking of 
legal process against a competitor is protected from antitrust challenge unless the 
invocation is a “sham,” which requires a showing that asserting the legal process is 
objectively unreasonable.
99
 Even bribery of a government official would not create 
antitrust liability for the person paying the bribe.
100
 But let us put these questions aside 
and focus on the jurisdictional test adopted by the Ninth Circuit. 
The court proceeded in three steps. First, it asked the basic jurisdictional question of 
whether the alleged restraint affected or was intended to affect United States foreign 
commerce. It refused to require an allegation or appearance of “direct and substantial” 
effects. Instead, the court held that subject matter jurisdiction is established upon a 
showing of “some effect,” actual or intended, on United States commerce. The plaintiff 
ultimately satisfied this test by alleging its ability and willingness to supply the American 
market with lumber that would have competed in the domestic marketplace. After 
defining a relevant product market and finding that United States imports from Honduras 
accounted for less than 0.1 percent of the American lumber market, the district court 
                                                          
97
It did not appear whether the bank's interest was anything more than as a lender to other 
lumber firms. 
98
See 1B ANTITRUST LAW  ¶274b. 
99
See 1 PHILLIP E, AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 2A-1 (4th ed. 
2013). 
100
See 1 ANTITRUST LAW ¶203. 
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had found a measurable effect,
102
 notwithstanding some doubt about the market 
definition. The Ninth Circuit agreed. 
However, the effects test standing alone was declared inadequate because it failed 
to reflect either the intensity of the foreign nation's interest, which may weigh against 
applying United States law, or the relationship between the alleged offender and the 
United States, which can more readily apply its own law to its citizens. 
Second, the court asked whether the alleged restraint is “of such a type and 
magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act.”
103
 It gave an 
affirmative answer on the ground that an alleged conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from 
milling lumber in Honduras and exporting it to the United States rises “to the level of a 
civil antitrust violation” that “has a direct and substantial anticompetitive effect.”
104
 
Although far from clear, the court seemed to mean that a conspiracy to obstruct a 
competitor is anticompetitive without further proof—a kind of per se offense. However, 
this is not a helpful description or analysis of the challenged conduct—the foreclosure of 
a mortgage securing an unpaid debt—as the court may itself have recognized in 
answering the next question. In all events, the court's second test seems to require the 
normal proof of an antitrust violation: very little for the so-called per se offenses and 
presumably much more where the rule of reason applies.  Thus, while one might laud 
the court's decision to include the weightiness of the substantive antitrust allegations in 
its determination of whether to consider the claim, the weight given in this case seems 
to have been greatly exaggerated. 
Third, the court asked whether regard for international comity and fairness 
counseled exerting jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct. The distinctive holding of 
Timberlane is that notwithstanding sufficient effects and an antitrust violation, the court 
may still decline to assert its extraterritorial jurisdiction unless the effect on United 
States commerce is sufficiently strong in the light of (1) the degree of conflict with 
foreign law or policy, (2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and their principal 
places of business,
107
 (3) the extent to which either state can expect compliance,
108
 (4) 
the relative effects on the several countries involved,
109
 (5) an explicit purpose to harm 
                                                          
102
See Timberlane, 1981-1 Trade Cas. ¶65,998 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Timberlane, 574 F. Supp. 
1453, 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 49 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 
(1985). 
103
Timberlane, 749 F.2d at 1383. 
104
Ibid. 
107
Slightly in favor of jurisdiction is that all parties except one had United states citizenship, 
although all the crucial witnesses were Honduran citizens or residents. 
108
Slightly in favor of jurisdiction is that any money judgment against the defendant could 
easily be enforced. 
109
Strongly against jurisdiction is the minuscule effect on United States lumber markets, in 
which all Honduran lumber accounts for less than 0.1 percent of the total and less than 4 percent 
of pine imports. Not only are the effects more significant on the Honduran lumber market, but 
the bank's actions also affect employment there, foreign exchange, taxes, and internal 
competition. 
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or affect United States commerce
110
 and the foreseeability of such an effect,
111
 and (6) 
the relative importance of conduct inside the United States.
112
 
After some ten years of litigation, the court dismissed the case, relying in essence on 
the legitimacy of the defendant's behavior within Honduras and the minuscule effects on 
competition in the United States.  Interestingly, he court concluded that a request for 
dismissal of a claim under its “jurisdictional rule of reason” should be raised under Fed. 
R. Civ. 12(b)(1) as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than 
as a motion under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim or as a motion for summary 
judgment.
4
 
A jurisdictional test that requires a decade of litigation to dispose of so insubstantial 
an antitrust claim seems much too unmanageable. Most important, some of the factors 
that the court cites—such as the relative effects of the defendant's conduct on the 
countries involved—require significant analysis of the merits of the antitrust dispute and 
the economic conditions and policies of the relevant countries. 
Further, while the court listed the numerous and varied factors set forth above, it 
gave little in the way of a calculus or standard for assessing the weight of each or how 
they should trade against one another. The result may yield a clear decision when all, or 
nearly all, of the factors point in one direction. But the Timberlane test is calculated to 
produce much confusion and indeterminacy when the factors are divided. 
Finally, given the insubstantial nature of the substantive claim, one wonders whether 
the court should have turned to such a complicated jurisdictional test at all. To be sure, 
the “jurisdictional” question as well as related questions of comity logically precede the 
decision on the merits, but in at least some cases where a very quick analysis of the 
merits shows the absence of any antitrust issue, dismissal should be appropriate for 
that reason, without application of so cumbersome a rule as the Timberlane court 
developed. 
For example, if a quick look at the complaint and answer tells us beyond reasonable 
dispute that the antitrust suit's basis is the defendant's invocation of Honduran judicial 
process to enforce an apparently valid debt, use of Timberlane's complex jurisdictional 
inquiry seems quite unnecessary. At the very least, one might say, the plaintiff must 
present a minimally plausible claim on the merits before the court is obliged to turn to 
complex jurisdictional inquiries. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, suing to collect a 
                                                          
110
Against jurisdiction is that the defendant's acts were directed primarily toward securing a 
greater return on its investment and were consistent with Honduran customs and practices; the 
plaintiff did not show that the defendant had any particular interest in affecting United States 
commerce. 
111
Against jurisdiction is that the defendant simply enforced its mortgage in an attempt to 
recoup its investment. The effects were simply those that flow inevitably from attempting to 
salvage something from a failing business. No reasonable investor would have foreseen the 
minimal effect on the United States that occurred here. 
112
Against jurisdiction is that virtually all the alleged illegal activity occurred in Honduras. 
4
 Timberlane, 574 F.Supp. at 1460-1461. 
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valid debt would be immune from the antitrust laws if the lawsuit had been filed in a 
United States court; the reasons for immunizing such a lawsuit when it occurs in a 
foreign court are at least as strong. 
 
Criminal Liability for Extraterritorial Anticompetitive Conduct 
Harming U.S. Interests 
 
The language of the Sherman Act applies its prohibitions to both foreign and 
domestic commerce and also provides that a violation can be a felony.
163
 Thus the 
statutory language certainly does not preclude that antitrust violations in foreign 
commerce could be criminal acts as well. At the same time, the government's long-
standing policy and the ruling case law make only a small subset of violations criminal 
acts, and one might perhaps conclude that only acts committed within United States 
territory should constitute criminal violations. Traditionally, American courts followed 
Justice Holmes's prescription in the American Banana case.
165
 that criminal jurisdiction 
was strictly territorial.
166
 However, in Pacific & Arctic Rwy.,
167
 the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that criminal antitrust jurisdiction could be obtained over all participants 
in a conspiracy that included both foreign and United States members. 
Today general criminal liability can be and frequently is attached to acts committed 
entirely outside the sovereign's territory,
168
 and the Sherman Act states no obvious 
reason why it should be treated as any different from other criminal statutes. The 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law takes this position: 
 
The principles governing [extraterritorial reach] apply to criminal as 
well as civil litigation. However, in the case of regulatory statutes 
that may give rise to both civil and criminal liability, such as United 
States antitrust and securities law, the presence of substantial 
foreign elements will ordinarily weigh against application of criminal 
law. In such cases, legislative intent to subject conduct outside the 
state's territory to its criminal law should be found only on the basis 
                                                          
163
"Every contract, combination … or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce … with 
foreign nations is illegal. Every person who shall make [such a contract] shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony…"  15 U.S.C. §1. 
165
See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).  
166
See, e.g., United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979) (Mexican 
national's agreement, executed in Mexico, to sell a car in Mexico that had been stolen in the 
United States not within jurisdiction of the United States courts). 
167
See United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913).  
168
See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 290 (5th Cir. 1980) (agreement to 
smuggle marijuana into United States within jurisdiction of United States courts even though all 
relevant acts were committed abroad). 
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of express statement or clear implication.
169
 
In Nippon the First Circuit concluded that price fixing that had occurred in Japan 
could be the subject of a United States criminal indictment.
170
 Nippon and unnamed co-
conspirators were accused of fixing the price of facsimile paper sold in North America, 
including the United States. The relevant meetings culminating in the challenged 
agreement all occurred in Japan. The alleged agreement was apparently facilitated with 
resale price maintenance agreements under which firms purchasing the paper in Japan 
promised to resell it at specified minimum prices in North America.
171
 Nippon then 
allegedly monitored resale prices within the United States in order to ensure that the 
maintained price was the one actually charged. 
In analyzing the Sherman Act and its case law,
172
 the court concluded that “one 
datum sticks out like a sore thumb”— namely, “in both criminal and civil cases, the claim 
that Section One applies extraterritorially is based on the same language in the same 
section of the same statute…”
173
 and 
common sense suggests that courts should interpret the same 
language in the same section of the same statute uniformly, 
regardless of whether the impetus for interpretation is criminal or 
civil.
174
 
The court then concluded: 
                                                          
169
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §403, comment f (1986). The government's 
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations §2.1 (1994) expressly leave open 
the possibility of criminal prosecution for acts occurring abroad. Section 2.91 of the Guidelines 
also discusses treaties providing for bilateral criminal enforcement agreements, and illustrative 
example H notes that the Department has and will continue to explore the possibility of seeking 
the aid of local law in pursuing violations abroad. But the Guidelines then warn that if “…local 
law does not provide adequate remedies, or the local authorities are not prepared to take action, 
the Department will weigh the comity factors, discussed in Section 3.2 infra, and take such 
action as is appropriate…” These Guidelines are reprinted in Appendix B of the Supplement. 
170
United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 1044 (1998). 
171
On the use of resale price maintenance to facilitate manufacturer collusion, see 8 PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP ¶1606 (3d ed. 2011). 
172
Just like the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 
796 (1993),  the First Circuit refused to place any weight on the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §6a.  Of course, that Act was not intended to cover the situation of 
a foreign cartel targeting United States markets, although it might limit recovery against a United 
States cartel targeting foreign markets. Significantly, however, nothing in the FTAIA limits its 
reach to non criminal actions. 
173
Nippon, supra, 109 F.3d at 4. 
174
Ibid. The court then cited a basic canon of statutory construction that “identical words or 
terms used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning,” citing 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 
513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995). 
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It follows, therefore, that if the language upon which the indictment 
rests were the same as the language upon which civil liability rests 
but appeared in a different section of the Sherman Act, or in a 
different part of the same section, we would be under great 
pressure to follow the lead of the Hartford Fire Court.
175
 and 
construe the two iterations of the language identically. Where, as 
here, the tie binds more tightly—that is, the text under consideration 
is not merely a duplicate appearing somewhere else in the statute, 
but is the original phrase in the original setting—the pressure 
escalates and the case for reading the language in a manner 
consonant with a prior Supreme Court interpretation is 
irresistible.
176
 
 
Thus, for the First Circuit the question of determining the appropriateness of 
extraterritorial criminal prosecution was entirely one of parsing the language of the 
statute, which—as we have noted before—never distinguishes its criminal and civil 
applications.  A concurring judge expressed reservations about this approach and 
concluded that:  
The task of construing Section One in this context is not the usual 
one of determining congressional intent by parsing the language or 
legislative history of the statute. The broad, general language of the 
federal antitrust laws and their unilluminating legislative history 
place a special interpretive responsibility upon the judiciary.
5
 
Nevertheless the judge found criminal jurisdiction appropriate in a case where 
raising prices in the United States was not only a foreseeable result of the 
challenged act, but it was also the principal and intended result. 
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the lack of any precedent made the 
invocation of criminal liability improper—that is, the case law failed to give the foreign 
actor fair notice that its wholly extraterritorial act might subject it to criminal antitrust 
prosecution.
178
 But as the court noted, while there is little in the way of antitrust 
precedent for applying a United States criminal statute to extraterritorial conduct, there 
was ample precedent from other statutes.
179
 For example, the manufacturing and sale 
of addictive drugs abroad targeting United States markets has frequently been 
condemned under criminal statutes notwithstanding that the defendants performed no 
                                                          
175
See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).  
176
Nippon, 109 F.3d at 5. 
5
 Nippon, supra, 109 F.3d at 9. 
178
Id.at 6. 
179
Ibid. at 6, citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (criminal acts committed in 
one state but causing injury in another state created jurisdiction in the latter when defendant 
intended to cause harmful consequences there). 
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acts within the United States.
180
 Of course, the drug laws are explicitly criminal 
provisions, consistently enforced both inside and outside the United States. As a result, 
citation to them does not fully address the additional problems confronted by application 
of the Sherman Act, because that statute is now more than a century old, with little 
history of criminal prosecution for purely extraterritorial acts. At the same time, however, 
the alleged conduct in this case, although committed abroad, unquestionably targeted 
United States markets and was allegedly committed in a clandestine fashion so as to 
avoid detection and prosecution. Further, comity did not counsel against application of 
United States law, for the alleged acts were unlawful under Japanese as well as United 
States Law.
181
 
"Interest" Analysis 
One important rationale for expansive reach and even criminal punishment in such 
cases is that the sovereign representing purchasers typically has a greater interest than 
the sovereign represei.nting sellers. As a general matter, a cartel in one country fixing 
the price of its goods elsewhere transfers wealth away from the territory containing the 
buyers and toward the territory containing the sellers. As a result, sovereigns, including 
the United States itself, have typically been less concerned with condemning restraints 
on export trade where all the buyers are foreign than with restraints on imports.  This 
aspect of United States policy is reflected in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements 
Act (FTAIA)
6
 as well as the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States. 
 
Thus an essentially territorial mode of analysis that looks at where the conspiracy 
was “formed”183 seems much less appropriate to the general policy question than an 
“interest” analysis considering where the victims are. In this case the predominant, 
although perhaps not the only,184 victims of the alleged conspiracy were consumers in 
                                                          
180
Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-1312 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
470 U.S. 1031 (1985) (unlawful drug trafficking from Malaysia into United States); United 
States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1981) (defendant intercepted by Coast Guard while at 
sea but en route to United States attempting to import unlawful drugs). 
181
Nippon, supra,109 F.3d at 8. The court did not note the position frequently urged by the 
government and quite often accepted that comity concerns either do not weigh heavily or should 
not be considered at all in a case where the federal government itself is bringing suit. See 
¶273c5. Ultimately, the lower court found that the alleged criminal conspiracy abroad had 
insufficient effect on foreign commerce during the limitation period. United States v. Nippon 
Paper Indus., Ltd., 62 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Mass. 1999). 
6
 See 1B ANTITRUST LAW ¶272i (4th ed. 2013). 
183
E.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909),United States v. 
Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913), & Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917). 
184
A Japanese cartel shipping all the cartelized goods elsewhere would have to reduce its 
output of goods into the cartelized market, perhaps with the result of a decline in locally 
consumed inputs, including employment. The size or impact of this decline would vary with the 
circumstances. For example, if the labor market were perfectly competitive, decreased 
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North America, where the cartel was targeted. By contrast, the principal beneficiaries 
were the owners of Japanese firms, perhaps their employees, perhaps the governments 
that taxed them, and perhaps others.185 This makes United States authorities a more 
appropriate criminal prosecutor than Japanese authorities, at least until we consider 
problems of obtaining essential testimony, other evidence, and a suitable criminal 
penalty.  As the concurring opinion pointed out, relying heavily on the Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law: 
Because only North American markets were targeted, the United 
States' interest in combatting this activity appears to be greater 
than the Japanese interest, which may only be the general interest 
of a state in having its industries comport with foreign legal norms. 
Japan has no interest in protecting Japanese consumers in this 
case as they were unaffected by the alleged conspiracy. The 
United States, in contrast, has a strong interest in protecting United 
States consumers, who were affected by the increase in prices.
7
  
Conclusion 
In its 2012 AU Optronics decision a district court in California held that the 
government has the authority to pursue price fixing that occurred abroad under a per se 
rule, which is generally a predicate to criminal liability.
8
  The court distinguished the 
Ninth Circuit's Metro Industries decision, which had held that wholly extraterritorial acts 
are to be governed by the rule of reason.
9
  In that case, as the Au Optronics court had 
observed in a previous decision, the conduct itself was novel and strongly suggested a 
rule of reason approach quite aside from the extraterritorial question.
10
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
production of Japanese fax paper would shift some labor away from fax paper production and to 
other production, but would have no impact on the overall labor market. 
185
Nippon, 109 F.3d at 12. 
7
 Nippon, 109 F.3d at 12 (relying heavily on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, §§403, 415). 
8
 United States v. AU Optronics Corp., 2012 WL 2120452 (N.D.Cal. June 11, 2012).  The 
district court granted the government's motion in limine and obtained an order: 
 
prohibiting defendants from presenting any evidence or argument that: (1) the 
agreements to fix or stabilize prices were “reasonable” or justifiable; (2) there were 
economic, benevolent, or other justifications for the agreements to fix or stabilize prices; 
(3) the agreements to fix or stabilize prices created real or imagined economic 
efficiencies for the defendants and their coconspirators; (4) agreements to fix or stabilize 
prices were necessary to avoid ruinous competition; (5) prices set for TFT-LCDs set by 
an agreement to fix or stabilize prices were reasonable; or (6) any variations on the 
foregoing. 
9
 Metro Industries, Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 868 
(1996). 
10
 See United States v. Hsuan Bin Chen, 2011 WL 332713 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2011). 
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In any event, the Metro Industries holding is not mandated by the Constitution or the 
statutory text in any antitrust provision, and it seems unwise as a matter of policy.  The 
purpose of the distinction between the per se rule and rule of reason is to identify and 
distinguish situations where anticompetitive effects can be assessed at relatively low 
administrative costs from those that require more complete analysis.  While the Ninth 
Circuit has spoken of a "jurisdictional" rule of reason, merging considerations of comity, 
foreign interests, and domestic effects from extraterritorial conduct into questions about 
market definition and competitive impact unnecessarily complicates a set of queries that 
are already complicated enough and are in fact quite different from one another. 
At the same time, however, the "affects" query takes on additional relevance in 
cases involving extraterritorial conduct, because legislative jurisdiction under the 
Commerce Clause or statutory reach under the Sherman Act or FTAIA require some 
harmful effect in the United States.  Thus, for example, a naked cartel abroad can be 
made subject to a criminal indictment and per se treatment.  However, the government 
would also have to show a sufficient effect justifying invocation of United States law -- 
for example, that some of the price-fixed goods were shipped into the United States. 
Showing such an affect need not require a market definition; indeed, the purpose of per 
se inquiries is to identify circumstances where these effects are deemed inherent in the 
practice itself. 
 Interestingly, in AT&T Mobility the Ninth Circuit subsequently held that California's 
Cartwright Act, a state antitrust law permitting indirect purchaser claims, had 
extraterritorial application in a per se price fixing case involving foreign conduct similar 
to that at issue in the Au Optronics case.
11
 Considerations of comity with foreign nations 
and other elements of extraterritorial jurisdiction weigh at least as heavily when the law 
to be applied is state rather than federal. 
 
                                                          
11
 AT&T Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 540859 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 14, 2013). 
